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This paper reviews rules governing the use by judges in United
States courts of their personal knowledge - as distinguished from
that supplied by the parties - in the adjudication of a civil case,
whether of the particular facts out of which the dispute arises, or of
general information with which the particular facts must be
processed, or of law which is to be applied to the particular facts.
A few salient features of the typical American civil lawsuit
must be noted here. In every principal jurisdiction of the United
States a substantial minority of civil cases1 are tried with a jury (a
group of up to 12 lay persons sitting separately from the judge, se-
lected ad hoc for each case at the beginning of the evidentiary hear-
ing) as fact-finder; the paper considers rules governing their use of
extra-record information as well. Even when a jury sits on the case,
the trial judge performs important proof-processing functions: su-
pervising pretrial exchange of information and evidence between
the parties ("discovery"), regulating the admissibility of evidence
and the manner of its presentation, determining whether or not the
evidence is sufficient to support a verdict for either party, and both
directing and evaluating the performance of the jury. These rulings
are ordinarily made only at the instance of one or more parties,
however, and lawyers for the parties have the overwhelming share
of responsibility for gathering, exchanging and presenting evidence.
When the judge decides without a jury, most of the exclusionary
rules of evidence designed for jury control are usually said to be in-
applicable, and the rule of trial concentration can be relaxed; but
the jury trial model retains its influence on many judges' handling
of the admission of evidence as well as on the form of presentation.
Except for some categories of minor cases in courts of limited juris-
diction, there is only one fact-instance, and appellate courts (sitting
in panels of three or more) base their decisions on the evidentiary
record developed at first instance.
* Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia
1. Davis, "A System of Judicial Notice Based on Fairness and Convenience", in
PERSPECTIVES ON LAW 69, 69-72 (R. Pound, E. Griswold & A. Sutherland, eds., 1964),
estimated that perhaps only one in six final trials involve juries, including criminal
cases; but reliable statistics are not at hand for more precise estimates.
HeinOnline  -- 34 Am. J. Comp. L. Supp. 237 1986
WILLIAM B. FISCH
The paper will follow the General Reporter's categorization of
judicial knowledge - "particular" (the specific facts of the case),
"general" (background for drawing inferences from and applying
presumptions to the particular facts), and "law". However, Ameri-
can courts do not always sharply distinguish them. The most widely
accepted term for "particular facts" is "adjudicative facts", coined by
Professor K.C. Davis in 19422 and incorporated into the Federal
Rules of Evidence 3 and the most recent version of the Uniform
Rules of Evidence4 , the latter now in effect in at least half of the
states. In this terminology there is no clear counterpart for "general
knowledge" as described by the General Reporter. The closest would
be "legislative facts", defined by Professor Davis in a similarly nega-
tive way as "not adjudicative"; 5 as the term indicates, however, the
category includes not only general facts used in the fact-finding pro-
cess, but also (even principally) facts used in the law-finding/law-
making process. These are dealt with under the heading of "law'.
In view of the space limitations imposed on this paper, it will
not be possible to reproduce exhaustively the law of each of the 52
principal American jurisdictions, which have separate judicial
heirarchies and very wide autonomy in the formulation of rules of
civil procedure. On most of the issues presented under this topic,
however, there is a remarkable degree of uniformity in declared ap-
proach, so that a few examples will usually suffice.
I. PARTICULAR KNOWLEDGE
A. The General Rule and its Enforcement
The traditional and still dominant position in the United States
is one of firm adherence to the adversary mode of civil procedure, a
centerpiece of which is the requirement that the trier of fact base
formal determination of the particular facts of the case on the proofs
properly presented in the course of the proceedings and reflected in
the record. The rationale for this position is captured in a widely
quoted passage from Professor Davis:
"The reason we use trial-type procedure, I think, is that we
make the practical judgment, on the basis of experience,
that taking evidence subject to cross-examination and re-
buttal, is the best way to resolve controversies involving dis-
putes of adjudicative facts, that is, facts pertaining to the
2. Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process,
55 Harv. L. Rev. 364, 404-407 (1942).
3. Rule 201(a), 28 U.S.C. (1974) (hereafter: "Federal Rules").
4. Uniform Rules of Evidence (hereafter: "Uniform Rules"), Rule 201(a), 13
Uniform Laws Annotated (Master Ed.) 209, 225 (1974).
5. E.g., in 3 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 15.3 (2d ed. 1980).
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parties. The reason we require a determination on the rec-
ord is that we think fair procedure in resolving disputes of
adjudicative facts calls for giving each party a chance to
meet in the appropriate fashion the facts that come to the
tribunal's attention, and the appropriate fashion for meet-
ing disputed adjudicative facts includes rebuttal evidence,
cross-examination, usually confrontation, and argument
(either written or oral or both)."'6
The degree of commitment to this principle in the United States
may be illustrated by rules of enforcement at three stages of the
judge's or juror's involvement in the case: (a) initial qualification to
sit on the case, (b) behavior during the proceedings, and (c) rendi-
tion of final verdict or judgment.
1. Initial Qualification
a. Judges
(1) Personal Knowledge of Disputed Fact. The Code of Judicial
Conduct, formulated in 1972 by the American Bar Association,
adopted by statute, court rule or judicial decision as disciplinary
standards in all but a handful of states,7 and mirrored in this respect
for federal judges by federal statute,8 provides as follows:
"A judge should disqualify himself in a proceeding in
which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned, in-
cluding but not limited to instances where:
(a) he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a
party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts
concerning the proceeding;. . .."
This provision, giving personal knowledge of disputed facts the
same effect as actual bias or prejudice, had no precise counterpart in
its predecessor Canons of Judicial Ethics,10 nor in pre-1974 versions
of the federal disqualification statute,1 ' all of which concerned them-
6. Davis, note 1 supra at 93, quoted, for example, in Advisory Committee Notes,
Federal Rules of Evidence, to Rule 201(b).
7. Brooks, How Judges Get Into Trouble, 23 Judges' J. 4,7 (Summer 1984), puts
the number at 46 jurisdictions (out of 51) which have adopted the Code.
8. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1) (1974).
9. American Bar Association, Code of Judicial Conduct (hereafter: "the Code"),
Canon 3(C)(1) (1972). 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1) (1974) is identical except that "should" is
replaced by "shall".
10. American Bar Association, Canons of Judicial Ethics, 49 A.B.A.Rep. 760
(1924).
11. Judicial Code § 20, 36 U.S.Stat. 1090 (1911), derived from the Act of May 8,
1792, 1 Stat. 278, § 11: "concerned in interest in any suit therein, or has been of coun-
sel or is a material witness for either party, or is so related to or connected with
either party as to render it improper, in his opinion, for him to sit on the trial. ..";
id. § 21: "has a personal bias or prejudice either against [a party] or in favor of any
opposite party..." These became 28 U.S.C. §§ 455 and 144, respectively, in 1948; the
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selves principally with grounds of disqualification based on present
or prior associations suggesting conflict of interest or potential parti-
ality, or at most with the conflicting role of (usually partisan) mate-
rial witness.12 The draftsmen of the Code cited no authority in their
notes, contenting themselves with the statement:
"The Committee also concluded that a judge cannot be, or
cannot appear to be, impartial if he has personal knowledge
of evidentiary facts that are in dispute. .... ,13
Reported decisions interpreting this language in the Code are
scarce, and most of them address the impact of prior proceedings; it
is consistently held that information acquired in the performance of
judicial duties - even if in the form of evidence improperly admit-
ted at a first trial 14 or properly acquired in a separate litigation 5 -
does not require disqualification ipso facto.16
One of the rare reported decisions under the federal statute in-
volved several problems of interpretation. In W. Cay Jackson En-
terprises, Inc. v. Greyhound Leasing & Financial Corp., 467 F.Supp.
801, 803 (D.P.R. 1979), the judge had represented one of the parties
ten years earlier as a labor negotiator, and recused himself on an op-
posing party's motion after a hearing at which he concluded that
facts which "may have come to his knowledge" in that prior repre-
sentation "may be 'disputed evidentiary facts concerning [this] pro-
ceeding' ". The statute provides for disqualification, as does the
Code,17 where the judge has served as a lawyer in the matter in con-
troversy,'8 but - unlike the conflict of interest rules for lawyers
latter remains essentially unchanged, while the former was replaced in 1974 with the
present language referred to above.
12. It will be noted, for example, that Judicial Code § 20, note 11 supra, in force
until 1948, spoke of having been a material witness "for either party". See also
Frank, Disqualification of Judges, 57 Yale L. J. 605, 618-635 (1947), and id., Disquali-
fication of Judges: In Support of the Bayh Bill, 35 Law & Contemp. P. 42, 48f (1970),
both of which discuss "bias or prejudice" in terms of partiality and do not include
personal knowledge of disputed fact as such, although the "Bayh Bill" which Frank
was supporting in fact prescribed disqualification "in any case in which he is or has
been a material witness", 35 Law & Contemp. P. at 68.
These associational grounds are of course retained in the revised statute and in
the code: service as lawyer or material witness in the matter by the judge or associ-
ated lawyer, financial interest in a party, martial or blood relationship to a party or
counsel or witness, etc.
13. E.W. Thode, Reporter's Notes to Code of Judicial Conduct 63 (1973).
14. See In re TL.S., 481 A.2d 1037 (Vt. 1984).
15. U.S. v. Coven, 662 F.2d 162 (2d Cir. 1982).
16. See also Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975), where the U.S. Supreme
Court held that it does not violate due process of law for investigative and adjudica-
tive functions to be combined in one person or body in the administrative process, it
being presumed (absent a showing to the contrary) that adjudicators have the capac-
ity and integrity to afford a fair hearing at each stage without bias or prejudice re-
sulting from prior official exposure to the matter.
17. Canon 3(C)(1)(b).
18. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(2) (1974).
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who have represented opposing parties at different times19 - that
disqualification does not extend to separate matters which are "sub-
stantially related"; presumably for that reason the judge did not dis-
cuss this provision. The prior association did present a situation in
which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned, even
without a specific showing of personal bias or prejudice; but under
the federal statute - unlike the Code - that general ground is sub-
ject to party waiver, and the relationship had been disclosed earlier
to the presently complaining party without objection. The specific
ground of personal knowledge, on the other hand, is not waivable
(under either statute or Code), and disqualification under the fed-
eral statute is mandatory. Moreover, the judge noted that the stat-
ute makes no distinction between cases with juries, in which the
judge will not be the principal trier of fact, and those without juries.
Finally, while the language of the provision could be interpreted as
requiring that the facts of which the judge has personal knowledge
be actually disputed, the judge in this case clearly assumed that a
substantial likelihood of dispute is sufficient to support
disqualification.
The Code phrases the obligation in the qualified form "should".
In smaller communities in which judges are likely to be acquainted
socially with many potential litigants, the more common practice is
surely to expect the judge to step aside only if he is unable to ignore
the improper information.20
The term "evidentiary fact" is not expressly defined in the code
or in cases interpreting it. However, it would appear to be essen-
tially coextensive with "adjudicative fact" as used in the rules gov-
erning judicial notice;21 the latter is defined as "the facts of the
particular case" or "facts concerning the immediate parties", for es-
tablishing which "the usual method. . .is through the introduction
of evidence. .. 22
It is impossible to assess the degree to which this disqualifica-
tion, based as it is on the risk or appearance of non-impartiality
rather than on actual bias, is honored in the breach. The rarity of
reported cases may reflect a number of factors, suggested here in in-
19. American Bar Association, Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.9(a)
(1983).
20. See Ausman v. Ausman, 31 Wis. 2d 79, 141 N.W.2d 869 (1967) (decided before
the Code).
21. See notes 2-4 above.
22. Federal Rules, Rule 201(a), Notes of Advisory Committee. See also the ap-
parently somewhat broader definition in McCormick on Evidence (hereafter: Mc-
Cormick) 920 (3d ed. Cleary, et al. 1984):
"["Adjudicative facts" are] about the particular event which gave rise to the
lawsuit and. . .(help) explain who did what, when, where, how, and with
what motive and intent."
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creasing order of common-sense probability: (i) a high degree of ac-
tual, voluntary conformity with the duty to recuse; (ii) the rarity of
actual instances of extra-judicial acquisition of dispositive informa-
tion without any other tainting association with interested parties;
(iii) the professional judge's confidence that improper sources will
not influence one's own performance; (iv) the difficulty of proving
possession of knowledge as such, and the reluctance of lawyers and
litigants to offend judges by motions to disqualify - especially if it is
not clear that the extraneous information will be prejudicial to any
particular party. Nonetheless, there are no recognized exceptions
which mitigate the duty not to rely on such information in render-
ing a decision.
(2) Role of Material Witness. Both the Code and the federal
statute call further for disqualification of a judge not only when the
judge has been a material witness 23 but also when he knows he is
likely to be such. 24 The former disqualification applies also if a law-
yer with whom the judge was then associated in practice has been a
material witness; the latter applies if a spouse or close relative is
likely to be a material witness. Curiously, the Code appears to per-
mit party waiver of the latter disqualification, though not of the for-
mer; it is likely, however, that only waiver of associational
disqualification was intended.25 The statute clearly precludes waiver
in either situation.26
b. Jurors
(1) Personal Knowledge of Disputed Fact. By an overwhelming
consensus of American jurisdictions, the judge is not required to dis-
qualify a prospective juror from sitting on a particular case merely
by reason of the juror's having personal knowledge of disputed facts
in the case, but only on a showing that he has formed an opinion
concerning the matter which is likely to influence his decision. In
practice, however, trial judges have wide discretion in ruling on
challenges for cause to particular jurors, and it is not uncommon to
sustain challenges based on personal experience with the type of dis-
23. Code, Canon 3(C)(1)(b); 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(2) (1974).
24. Code, Canon 3(C)(1)(d)(iv); 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(5)(iv).
25. Canon 3(D):
"A judge disqualified by the terms of... Canon 3(C)(1)(d) may, instead of
withdrawing from the proceeding, disclose on the record the basis of his dis-
qualification. If, based on such disclosure, the parties and lawyers, indepen-
dently of the judge's participation, all agree in writing that the judge's
relationship is immaterial or that his financial interest is insubstantial, the
judge is no longer disqualified. .."
26. 28 U.S.C. § 455(e): "No justice, judge or magistrate shall accept from the par-
ties to the proceeding a waiver of any ground for disqualification enumerated in sub-
section (b)."
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pute or situation involved in the case.27
(2) Role of Material Witness. Since the juror with personal
knowledge of fact is not automatically disqualified unless he has
formed an opinion, and a material witness is virtually by definition a
person who has formed an opinion as to relevant facts, separate dis-
cussion of the prospective-witness ground is unnecessary and hard to
find. Nonetheless it is clear that the likelihood of being called as a
material witness disqualifies a juror just as it does a judge.
2. Conduct During the Proceeding
a. Ex Parte Communications or Other Unauthorized
Inquiry
(1) Judges. The Code of Judicial Conduct provides:
"A judge should. . ., except as authorized by law, neither
initiate nor consider ex parte or other communications con-
cerning a pending or impending proceeding ... .
The prohibition is of long standing, and was embodied in the Canons
of Judicial Ethics of 1924.29
Reported cases applying this rule are infrequent, and most of
those involve either fairly clear partiality30 or inadequate opportu-
nity to be heard.3' It will be noted that the judge is precluded from
initiating or considering such communications or investigations;
when the intiative comes from another person, it is presumed that
the judge is capable of ignoring the information improperly
presented, and disqualification or recusal should not be required
merely by reason of such communications.
(2) Jurors. There is more frequent litigation of the effect of un-
authorized communications or inquiries involving jurors, and a
number of recent cases reiterate the traditional policy of strict con-
trol over the evidence presented to the jury, and the corollary prohi-
bition against consideration of information improperly
27. E.g., Missouri, whose statute excludes from particular cases any person "who
has formed or expressed an opinion concerning the matter, or any material fact in
controversy", Mo. Rev. Stat. § 494.190 (1978). Compare Genova v. Kansas City, 254
S.W.2d 38 (Mo.App. 1953)(no prejudicial opinion formed) with McCormick v. Smith,
459 S.W.2d 272 (Mo. 1970)(common experience and prejudicial interest in the
question).
28. Canon 3(A)(4).
29. Note 10 supra, Canon 17, 1st para.:
"He should not permit private interviews, arguments or communications
designed to influence his judicial action, where interests to be affected
thereby are not represented before him, except in cases where provision is
made by law for ex parte application."
30. E.g., In re Turner, 421 So.2d 1077 (Fla. 1982) (abusive visits to child custody
claimant's home to monitor her behavior).
31. E.g., Franks v. Franks, 181 Neb. 710, 150 N.W.2d 252 (1967) (independent in-
vestigation followed by overriding of agreed settlement in divorce case).
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communicated to the jury. Indeed it has been held that ex parte
communication with a juror during the trial by the attorney for one
of the parties requires a mistrial (discharging the jury and starting
all over again with a new jury) unless the party can show that the
communication was harmless. 32 The same rule has been applied to
conversations between jurors and witnesses,33 and between jurors
and judge. 34
Numerous recent cases deal with unauthorized individual juror
"views", in which a verdict is challenged on the ground that a juror
has gone to the scene of the accident which is the subject matter of
the litigation, or made other independent inquiry into the particular
facts of the case. Such conduct is "invariably. . .regarded as im-
proper",35 although it may be found not harmful enough to require
retrial.
When such misconduct on the part of one or more jurors is
shown, and it is also shown that it provided an opportunity to ac-
quire independent evidence on disputed fact questions, the case must
be retried with a new jury unless it can be established that no preju-
dice has resulted to the objecting party, which means that it is not
reasonably possible that the improperly acquired information will
influence or has influenced the verdict.36
In virtually all jurisdictions a judge does have the discretionary
power - often embodied in statute but regarded in any event as in-
herent in the judicial function - to authorize a jury inspection of
places or objects located away from the courtroom.37 There is de-
bate on whether such a view constitutes an independent source of
evidence - that is, whether a verdict can stand which is not sup-
ported by any evidence in the record other than what might have
been seen at a view - or is merely an opportunity to facilitate the
32. Printed Terry Finishing Co. v. City of Lebanon, 372 A.2d 460 (Pa. Super.
1977).
33. Langston v. Hileman, 284 Ark. 140, 680 S.W.2d 89 (1984).
34. Argo v. Goodstein, 424 Pa. 612, 228 A.2d 195 (1967).
35. 4 J. Wigmore, Evidence (hereafter: Wigmore) § 1166 (Chadbourn rev. 1972).
For recent examples of prejudicial misconduct see Hallmark v. Allison, 451 So.2d 270
(Ala. 1984) and Keyes v. Amundson, 343 N.W.2d 78 (N.D. 1983) (unauthorized views
of scene); Andrews v. County of Orange, 130 Cal.App.3d 944, 182 Cal.Rptr. 176 (ju-
ror's disclosure to others of conversation with realtor on home value) and Simmons
v. State of Maine, 222 A.2d 366 (Me. 1966) (juror's use of own real estate appraisal
book).
36. See Keyes, supra. For examples of cases in which the absence of prejudice
was established (the most common, since the granting of a new trial by the trial
judge is normally not appealable and ruling of state trial judges are not reported),
see Stackiewicz v. Nissan Motor Corp. in U.S.A., 686 P.2d 925 (Nev. 1984); Fantin v.
Mahnke, 113 Wis.2d 92, 334 N.W.2d 564 (App. 1983)(facts observable at unauthorized
view of accident scene not in dispute); Bostic v. Mitchell, 363 So.2d 1356 (Miss. 1978);
Erickson v. Perrett, 572 P.2d 518 (Mont. 1977).
37. McCormick § 216; 4 Wigmore § 1163.
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jury's understanding of evidence presented in other forms; the more
accepted position is that observations made at a view do constitute
"evidence", even though they cannot be incorporated into the record
for purposes of review.3 There is also disagreement over whether
any other evidence may be presented to the jury during a view -
such as witness testimony - which can be presented in court,
although if the judge and party representatives attend there should
be no objection to that.39 In any event, the view must be authorized
by the judge or it is improper, even if all jurors attend and no other
evidence is offered in conjunction therewith.40
Proof of misconduct on the part of jurors may be complicated in
a number of jurisdictions by application of the traditional rule,
designed to prevent harassment of jurors and wholesale duplication
of their effort, that jurors will not be heard to impeach their own
verdict. However, the more common view is that jurors may testify
as to the improper introduction of extraneous prejudicial informa-
tion into the deliberations, even if their testimony is excluded con-
cerning their individual mental processes.41
b. Judge or Juror as Witness
We have noted that a judge is disqualified from sitting on a case
if he is likely to be a material witness. This prohibition against per-
forming the dual role is also expressed, in the federal courts and
many state courts, by declaring the judge's testimony inadmissible so
long as he remains as judge,42 although the earlier common law view
was otherwise.43 The same rule applies in those jurisdictions to ju-
rors, reversing earlier rules to the contrary.44
3. Consistency of Verdict or Judgment with Evidence
a. Juries
Civil juries may consider only the properly admitted evidence,
along with reasonable inferences therefrom, in resolving disputed is-
sues of fact. The judge determines, as a matter of law, what factual
issues must be decided and which party has the burden of persua-
sion (i.e., the risk that the trier of fact is undecided, or the "risk of
nonpersuasion") on each. As indicated above, judges are commonly
called upon to evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence to support a
38. 4 Wigmore § 1168.
39. McCormick p. 680; 4 Wigmore pp. 385f.
40. 4 Wigmore § 1166.
41. Federal Rules and Uniform Rules, Rule 606(b); F. James and G. Hazard,
Civil Procedure § 7.19 (2d ed. 1977).
42. Federal Rules and Uniform Rules, Rule 605.
43. McCormick § 68.
44. Federal Rules and Uniform Rules, Rule 606(a).
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verdict (before submission of the case to the jury), and the consis-
tency of the jury's verdict with the evidence (after verdict). The
verbal forumlas employed by courts to define the scope of this re-
view vary somewhat, but there is agreement on the core idea that
the jury will be foreclosed from deciding any issue - by means of a
directed verdict before submission, or entry of a judgment notwith-
standing any contrary verdict thereafter - if the judge is persuaded
that the properly presented evidence, along with reasonable infer-
ences therefrom, permit only one conclusion thereon in the light of
the burden of persuasion.
b. Judges
Where a judge sits without a jury, the final judgment may be
supported by specific findings of fact and conclusions of law, as in
the federal system,45 or may be rendered in more summary form. In
either event, the judgment is subject to review on appeal for its con-
sistency with the evidence. While the precise formula may vary
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, it is clear that if a judgment is not
supported by any evidence in the record, it will be overturned.
B. Judicial Notice of Adjudicative Fact
The term "judicial notice" in the American cases can be seen to
refer to virtually the entire range of our topic, namely the judicial
use of knowledge acquired by means other than formal evidentiary
proof. If one limits it to adjudicative fact, however, and defines it as
the judicial assumption of the truth of a material fact about the par-
ties or their particular dispute, which one of the parties would
otherwise be required to establish by evidence, the range of disa-
greement among major American commentators about the basic
rules narrows considerably. The most visible debate has been over
the degree of indisputability required before proof of the fact may be
dispensed with. One view, advocated by Thayer 46, Wigmore,47 and
Davis,48 would permit a judge to notice facts which "can safely be
assumed by him to be true until disputed by contrary evidence" 49
that is, which seem to the judge to be unlikely to be disputed. That
view favors judicial notice in the interest of expediting litigation.
The other view, associated with Morgan,50 is that, because of limita-
45. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 52(a), 28 U.S.C. (1978).
46. J. Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at Common Law 309 (1898).
47. 9 Wigmore § 2567 (3d ed. 1940); J. Wigmore, Code of Evidence, Rule 240 (3d
ed. 1942).
48. Note 1 supra.
49. J. Wigmore, Code of Evidence, Rule 240 (3d ed. 1942).
50. Morgan, Judicial Notice, 57 Harv. L. Rev. 269 (1944); E. Morgan, Basic
Problems of Evidence 8f. (1962).
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tions on judicial access to relevant information, evidence of a fact
should be dispensed with only if its probability is "so great as to
make the truth of the proposition notoriously indisputable among
reasonable men".51 Judicial notice is thus discouraged in the inter-
est of fairness. The difference in views would appear to resolve it-
self technically into a procedural one, namely the admissibility of
formal evidence tending to disprove a fact once judicially noticed.
At least prior to the adoption of the 1974 Federal and Uniform
Rules, the cases and statutes seemed to be "in cloudy confusion" 52
on this point. With the adoption of those rules by a majority of
states, the prevailing position should be that of Morgan; they permit
judicial notice of adjudicative fact only if it is "not subject to reason-
able dispute", either as common knowledge or as "capable of accu-
rate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy
cannot reasonably be questioned". 53
1. Matters of Common Knowledge
The 1953 version of the Uniform Rules of Evidence, adopted in
four states54, distinguished between facts which are universally
known and those which are generally known in the court's territo-
rial jurisdiction: the former are required to be noticed without any
request by a party, whereas the latter may be noticed but are re-
quired to be noticed only on request of a party supplying sufficient
information.55 In the 1974 version of the Uniform Rules (adopted in
at least 26 states)5 6 - as in the Federal Rules of Evidence on which
it was based - this distinction is eliminated;57 it is not clear that it
was ever significant in the cases. The test under the present version
is always indisputability within the territorial jurisdiction of the
trial court; notice of such facts is permissible without request, and is
required if requested and supported by sufficient information.
Whether a fact is so commonly known as not to be "subject to rea-
sonable dispute" must inevitably be decided on a case-by-case basis.
On the one hand, the truth of the asserted fact may be disputa-
ble, as in a child custody case where the court improperly took judi-
cial notice (i.e., assumed without proof in the record) that a lesbian
51. 57 Harv. L. Rev. at 274.
52. McNaughton, Judicial Notice - Excerpts Relating to the Morgan-Wigmore
Controversy, 14 Vand. L. Rev. 779, 796 (1961). Cf. Davis, note 1 supra at pp. 88f., who
disputes this characterization of the cases.
53. Federal and Uniform Rules, Rule 201(b).
54. California, Kansas, New Jersey, and Utah: 13 Uniform Laws Annotated 209
(Master Ed. 1980).
55. Uniform Rules of Evidence, Rule 9(1,2(c)), 9A Uniform Laws Annotated 599
(1965).
56. 13 Uniform Laws Annotated, Supp.Pamphl. 18 (1985).
57. Rule 201(b).
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household (which the mother maintained) would have an adverse
effect on the child.58  On the other hand, the facts in question may
be known not commonly, but only to the judge personally. A widely
cited example involved a landowner's suit to enjoin a city from
flooding his land by interfering with the natural water flow in im-
pounding its water supply, and to require the city to restore his land
to its natural state. The trial judge ruled at the outset that a
mandatory injunction (requiring the city to drain the land) would
not be ordered and that only damages could be recovered. In so rul-
ing, the judge asserted that the land could not be drained without
prohibitive expense, referring to his own observation of the specific
land by air 40 years earlier, to his own experience as a lawyer litigat-
ing such issues, and to his own experience as an owner of adjacent
land who found draining it economically unfeasible. The appellate
court ordered a full trial of the claim for injunctive relief, saying
that "many of the judicial comments were factual statements within
the extrajudicial knowledge of the judge and these are not to be ju-
dicially noticed nor an ingredient in the determination of any phase
of the litigation. '59
Although the Rules permit notice to be taken at any stage of
the proceedings,60 it is often said that appellate courts, whose deci-
sions are normally to be based solely on the record produced at trial,
should be especially reluctant to take judicial notice of facts not al-
ready established in the record, for fear of depriving a party of a fair
opportunity to be heard.6
1
2. Readily Ascertainable Facts
If at one time it was thought that notice could be taken only of
facts which could be supposed to be in every reasonably informed
person's head, the "more modern test"62 permits reference to
sources of indisputable accuracy.63 If a source is of disputed accu-
racy, or if it expresses debatable expert opinion of the sort - be-
cause of the hearsay rule - normally to be offered in court through
properly qualified witnesses,64 judicial notice of the fact will be de-
58. Bezio v. Patenaude, 410 N.E.2d 1207 (Mass. 1980).
59. Fox v. City of West Palm Beach, 383 F.2d 189, 195 (5th Cir. 1967).
60. Federal Rules and Uniform Rules, Rule 201(f).
61. E.g., Masters v. Rodgers Development Group, 321 S.E.2d 194, 197 (S.C.App.
1984). But see Administrators of the Tulane Educational Fund v. Cooley, 462 So.2d
696 (Miss. 1984) (appellate judges supplemented record evidence of defendant's con-
tacts with the state for jurisdictional purposes, with personal exposure to its activi-
ties in the state).
62. 1 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence (hereafter: Weinstein) p.
201-26 (1982).
63. E.g., Beardsley v. Irving, 81 Conn. 489, 71 A. 580 (1909) (error to allow jury to
decide whether a specific date was a Sunday).
64. Federal Rules and Uniform Rules, Rule 803(18), limit the admissibility of
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nied, even if in the absence of a jury the hearsay objection might be
overcome for purposes of admission of the source into evidence
when offered by a party.65
It is generally said that the meaning of words in foreign lan-
guages is not a proper subject for judicial notice,66 it being supposed
that it is not common knowledge in the jurisdiction. However, if a
particular proposition concerning the meaning of a foreign word
were to satisfy the standards of indisputability specified in the
Rules, there would not be any reason to refuse it. It remains clear,
however, that the judge's personal, extrajudicial knowledge of for-
eign languages is ordinarily to be excluded.
3. Procedural Incidents of Judicial Notice
While the substantive requirement for judicial notice of adjudi-
cative facts is that they not be subject to reasonable dispute, the
Rules also specify some procedural rules for the process. First,
under Rule 201(e) a party who requests it must be given an opportu-
nity to be heard with respect to the propriety of judicial notice, if
not before then after notice is taken; in making the determination of
noticeability, the court may utilize any appropriate source of infor-
mation without regard to formal rules of evidence, and may go be-
yond the information supplied by the parties. It has been held that
when both parties are present at the reading of a memorandum deci-
sion by the judge, the opportunity to object to factual assumptions
therein is afforded and therefore the requirement of Rule 201(d) is
met.67 Obviously a determination that the proposed fact is reason-
ably subject to dispute restores to the party asserting it the normal
burden of introducing proper evidence. Second, if notice is taken,
under Rule 201(g) the jury (if any) must be instructed to accept as
true the fact noticed.
In some jurisdictions which have not adopted the Rules, the
courts purport to follow the Thayer-Wigmore approach which treats
judicial notice as only a provisional determination, leaving the party
disadvantaged by notice free to introduce countervailing evidence.68
The precise impact of this position with respect to adjudicative facts
is unclear. Most of the reported cases involve non-adjudicative uses
of judicial notice in jury trials, and relate to the admissibility of evi-
learned treatises - otherwise excluded as hearsay - to their use by experts testify-
ing on the stand, or by counsel in cross-examining such experts.
65. On the general relaxation of exclusionary rules in judge-tried cases, see Mc-
Cormick § 60.
66. E.g., Rosman v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 40 A.D.2d 963, 338 N.Y.S.2d 664
(1972); Herman v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 40 A.D.2d 850, 337 N.Y.S.2d 827 (1972).
67. Hadland v. Schroeder, 326 N.W.2d 709, 713 (N.D. 1982).
68. See cases collected in McNaugthon, note 52 supra, at 796-804 (1961).
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dence of general facts which must be connected to the particular
parties by other evidence; cases contemplating (or indeed rejecting)
on-the-record evidence directly contradicting a noticed fact are
scarce. 69 Since the Rules require an opportunity to be heard before
the judge concerning the propriety of taking notice, the issue be-
comes precisely one of whether the countervailing information is on-
the-record evidence or a less formal presentation to the judge as on
questions of law. In a non-jury trial, where the formal rules of evi-
dence are frequently relaxed and the judge is the finder of fact, the
distinction should be "of little significance" for adjudicative facts.70
II. GENERAL KNOWLEDGE
A. Judicial Notice of Non-Adjudicative Fact
In two earlier attempts at codifying the law of evidence, the
American Law Institute's Model Code of Evidence7' and the 1953
version of the Uniform Rules of Evidence,72 judicial notice of fact --
both "specific fact" and "generalized knowledge" - was limited to
propositions beyond reasonable dispute. The Federal Rules (fol-
lowed here by the 1974 Uniform Rules) do not purport to say any-
thing at all about "generalized knowledge", and the Advisory
Committee's note explains this omission on the ground that neither
policy nor practice limits the use of generalized knowledge to indis-
putables. 73 Rather, most of the actual judicial uses of generalized
knowledge in a jury trial, says the Committee, are non-adjudicative
in nature: "determining the validity and meaning of statutes, formu-
lating common-law rules, deciding whether evidence should be ad-
mitted, assessing the sufficiency and effect of evidence", which
cannot practically be limited to indisputables;74 moreover, both
judges and juries as triers of fact utilize much non-adjudicative fact
of a generalized character - most often without explicit statement
- simply as part of the reasoning process, to which formalized rules
of judicial notice, such as a requirement of a right to be heard on the
69. E.g., Scheufler v. Continental Life Ins. Co., 169 S.W.2d 359, 365 (Mo. 1943)
(citing J. Thayer, note 46 supra; but it is clear that the problem was not the truth of
the material judicially noticed but its sufficiency to support the court's judgment).
Cf. Jackson v. Cherokee Drug Co., 434 S.W.2d 257, 264 (Mo. App. 1968) (mortality ta-
bles to show life expectancy, mentioned for the first time in final argument to the
jury, improper to overrule objection because opponent had no opportunity to intro-
duce countervailing evidence - the appellate court found no prejudice, however,
and in any event the mortality tables, merely showing statistics about populations as
a whole, do not constitute "adjudicative facts" about the particular parties).
70. See 1 Weinstein at p. 201-50.
71. American Law Institute, Model Code of Evidence, secs. 801-804 (1942).
72. Uniform Rules of Evidence, Rules 9(1,2), 10(3), 9A Uniform Laws Annotated
599-600 (1965).
73. Federal Rules, Rule 201(b), Advisory Committee's note.
74. Id. The insight is traceable at least to J. Thayer, note 46 supra, at 279 (1898).
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propriety of using them, are inappropriate. 75
Many courts in jurisdictions governed by the Federal or Uni-
form Rules cite the written rule in connection with judicial notice of
non-adjudicative facts, without recognizing the Rule's inapplicabil-
ity.7 6 One may well wonder if such courts sometimes refrain from
taking notice or assuming the truth of non-adjudicative facts which
they would otherwise accept as true, in the belief that the formal re-
quirements of the Rule - indisputability and opportunity to be
heard - apply and are not met. It seems likely, however, that most
rejections of non-adjudicative facts proposed for notice result from
non-persuasion. In jurisdictions having no codified rule on judicial
notice the distinction between adjudicative facts and non-adjudica-
tive or legislative facts is often not explicitly acknowledged, but the
flexible Thayer/Wigmore view concerning disputability and the
right to be heard is often accepted and probably produces similar re-
sults to those contemplated by the Advisory Committee.
For general knowledge used in the fact-finding process, then, if
the court becomes aware of the issue at all, it is believed that most
courts would afford an opportunity to be heard informally if there
seems a potential for dispute, and require formal proof only if con-
vinced that there is a reasonable basis for dispute and that the prop-
osition is susceptible to evidentiary treatment.77
B. Requirement of Expert Testimony
Although the historical position of American law, that witnesses
may testify only to facts observed by them and not to inferences or
opinions based on facts, has been modified in most jurisdictions to a
requirement that opinions must be based on the witness' perception
and be helpful to the trier of fact,78 most of the literature on the
subject has been concerned with when such opinion is permitted.
Expert opinion, which may involve the expression of opinion con-
cerning facts not personally known to the witness but based on spe-
cialized knowledge, is said in the Rules to be permissible when the
opinion would "assist" the trier of fact - possessing the common
knowledge of ordinary persons - "to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue" (Rule 702). Many state courts, however,
have read an "only" into the Rule, and have excluded expert testi-
75. Id., notes to Rule 201(a).
76. Indeed Prof. Davis asserts that "(a)lmost all cases that cite [Federal] Rule
201 improperly use it", and gives examples in 3 K. Davis, Administrative Law Trea-
tise § 15.6 (1980).
77. This is roughly Professor Davis' proposal for the entire field of judicial no-
tice, see note 1 supra.
78. Federal and Uniform Rules, Rule 701.
HeinOnline  -- 34 Am. J. Comp. L. Supp. 251 1986
WILLIAM B. FISCH
mony where common knowledge is considered sufficient. 79
Whether an expert witness is required, on the other hand, will
be tested in terms of the sufficiency of the evidence, absent such tes-
timony, to support a finding in favor of a party bearing the burden
of proof on the particular fact. If the ordinary non-expert, which
the trier of fact (whether jury or judge!) is presumed to be, could
not properly draw the necessary inferences from the evidence, the
evidence will be insufficient and the finding cannot stand. While the
courts are not quick to identify such cases, it is commonly held that
proof of professional malpractice - both the establishment of the
standard of care and the proof of causal relationship between breach
and damage - requires the testimony of a qualified member of the
profession in question.80 On the other hand, it is often said that the
judge, being a lawyer, has sufficient expertise to decide certain ques-
tions of lawyer's professional competence, particularly the reason-
able value of lawyers' services. 81
III. LAW
A. In General
The obligation of a judge to know the law of his own state, in-
cluding federal law, to take notice of its content whether brought to
his attention by the parties or not, and to use whatever sources are
appropriate to the purpose, is now well established in the United
States.8 2 While judges normally rely on counsel for help in finding
the law, they are not required to do so, nor are they required in
every instance to notify counsel in advance when they propose to
rely on law not submitted by them, so long as the parties have an
opportunity afterwards either to request reconsideration or to ap-
peal.8 3 In most states this extends to federal and state administra-
tive regulations and executive orders; a majority of states appear to
retain the rule that judicial notice will not be taken of private laws
and municipal ordinances, subjecting them to the rules of
evidence.84
The traditional rule that the law of sister states will not be no-
ticed, but must be proved, has been abandoned in most states, usu-
ally through the adoption of the Uniform Judicial Notice of Foreign
79. E.g., Shore v. Mohave County, State of Arizona, 644 F.2d 1320 (10th Cir.
1981); Syrowik v. City of Detroit, 119 Mich.App. 343, 326 N.W.2d 507 (1982).
80. W.Prosser & W.Keeton, Torts 118 (5th ed. 1984).
81. E.g., Newman v. Silver, 553 F. Supp. 485, 497 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); In re Marriage
of Cueva, 86 Cal.App.3d 290, 149 Cal.Rptr. 918 (1979).
82. E.g., McCormick 938-939; 1 Weinstein at pp. 200-6,7.
83. 1 Weinstein at p. 200-7 (1982).
84. McCormick 939-940.
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Law Act8 5 or a similar statute; the more progressive of these stat-
utes extends the notice to regulations, ordinances and rules as well
as common law and statutes, either permissively8 6 or mandatorily.
8 7
In several states88 and the federal courts8 9 the law of foreign na-
tions is removed from the traditional regime of evidentiary proof,
either by judicial notice or by simply treating the issue as one of law
for the court. Often, as in the federal rule, the party seeking to rely
on foreign-country law is required to give notice of that fact in order
to trigger the court's duty. The majority of states, however, treat
foreign-country law as a fact to be proved in the normal way (ideally
by expert testimony) by the party seeking to rely on it.90
B. Judicial Notice of Legislative Fact
Facts "utilized for informing a court's legislative judgment on
questions of law and policy",91 like generalized knowledge used in
fact-finding, are not covered by the Rules on judicial notice. It is
clear, however, that in a system such as the United States where all
courts have power not only to make ordinary law ("common law",
subject to legislative control) but also to determine the consistency
of judicial, legislative and executive acts with federal and state con-
stitutions, the assumption of social, political and economic facts rele-
vant to determining the content of the law plays a major role in
judging. It is equally clear that the process cannot be subjected gen-
erally to formal requirements of indisputability or right to a hearing,
or to limitations on the sources on which the judge relies 92 -
although judges in their discretion may act under such restraints in
particular cases.93 Since it is the court's duty to know the law, it is
not subject to rules allocating burdens of proof to the parties, and
factual premises underlying the law must be determined by the
judge whether disputed or not. Rather, judicial dependence on per-
85. 9A Uniform Laws Ann. 550 (1965).
86. E.g., Delaware Uniform Rules of Evidence, Rule 202(d), 16 Dela. Code Ann.
497 (1981).
87. E.g., Ore. Rev. Stat. § 40.090(2,4) (1983).
88. E.g., Ore. Rev. Stat. § 40.090(6) (1983); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. c. 233, sec. 70
(1959); N.Y. Civ.Pr.L. & R. 4511(b) (1963).
89. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 44.1, 28 U.S.C. (1966).
90. McCormick at pp. 942-943.
91. Davis, note 2 supra, at 402.
92. See, e.g., 1 Weinstein at pp. 200-13f.; McCormick 928f.; Davis, note 1 supra, at
81-88.
93. For a relatively rare judicial use of the "legislative fact" terminology, where
the court spoke of "generally known or easily ascertainable facts" but sustained a
trial judge in taking judicial notice of the "legislative fact" that "no malpractice cri-
sis existed in 1981", for purposes of determining the constitutionality of discrimina-
tory legislation, see Boucher v. Sayeed, 459 A.2d 87 (R.I. 1983).
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suasiveness, the appellate judicial machinery and the normal legisla-
tive process must be relied on to correct errors of legislative fact.
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